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ABSTRACT 
 
Understanding Wage Floor Setting in 
Industry-Level Agreements: Evidence from France* 
 
This paper examines empirically how industry-level wage floors are set in French industry-
level wage agreements and how the national minimum wage (NMW) interacts with industry-
level wage bargaining. For this, the authors use a unique dataset containing about 50,000 
occupation-specific wage floors in 365 French industries over the period 2007-2015. They 
find that the NMW has a significant impact on the seasonality and on the timing of the wage 
bargaining process. Inflation, past sectoral wage increases and real NMW increases are the 
main drivers of wage floor adjustments; elasticities of wage floors with respect to these macro 
variables are 0.6, 0.4 and 0.2 respectively. Wage floor elasticities to inflation and to the NMW 
both decrease along the wage floor distribution but are still positive for all levels of wage 
floors. 
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1. Introduction 
Wage setting institutions are often considered as one of the key differences between US and 
European labor markets. Contrary to the United States, a vast majority of workers in 
European countries are covered by collective wage bargaining which shapes wage setting 
within firms. In France, as in many other European countries, unions and employers’ 
associations bargain at the industry level on wage floors for a set of representative job 
occupations which are specific to the industry. Those wage floors should be higher than the 
national minimum wage (NMW) which is a legal national wage floor, binding for all workers. 
To keep wage floors above the NMW, industries may have to update thousands of industry-
level wage floors after an increase in the NMW. Since industry-level agreements are quasi 
automatically extended to all employees in an industry (see Villanueva, 2015, for a survey on 
extension procedures in Europe), those wage floors are then binding for all firms and are used 
as references for firms’ wage policies. Thus, the NMW is not only a floor for all wages but it 
is also embedded into a complex system of institutions of wage bargaining. Similar patterns 
are observed in other European countries and a recent but growing literature focuses on how 
industry-level wage agreements affect labor market outcomes (see Díez-Catalán and 
Villanueva, 2014, for Spain, Martins, 2014, and Guimaraes et al., 2015, for Portugal).1 
However, little is known about the determinants of wage floor adjustments and how they 
interact with NMW increases. In this paper, we investigate how wage floors adjust to shocks 
in French industry-level agreements by using a large and unique dataset consisting of about 
50,000 job-specific wage floors over the period 2007-2015. 
Our first contribution is to open the black box of industry-level bargaining in France and 
deepen our knowledge of the functioning of wage bargaining institutions that are widespread 
in Europe (Visser, 2016). For this purpose, we collect a large and unique new dataset 
containing the whole industry-specific scales of wage floors for 365 French industries 
(covering about 75% of workers of the private sector) over the period 2007-2015. In each 
industry, wage floors are defined for a specific classification of representative occupations. 
Those wage floors are then used by firms as a reference to set their wages. For instance, 
Luciani (2014) finds that industry level is the dominant level in the wage setting process for 
one third of French firms whereas André (2012) obtain a significantly positive short-term 
elasticity of actual wages to wage floors (see Lopez-Novella and Sissoko (2013) for similar 
                                                     
1
 Magruder (2012) reports similar institutional features of wage bargaining in South Africa and finds that 
centralised bargaining has a negative effect on employment. 
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evidence on Belgian data). In our dataset, we are able to observe for several years a wage 
floor associated with a given occupation within the industry-level job classification, which 
allows us to compute the size of occupation-specific wage floor adjustments between two 
wage agreements. Overall, our dataset contains about 50,000 wage floors for around 6,500 
different occupations defined in industry agreements. Our paper provides new stylised facts 
on how industry wage floors are adjusted in France. We contribute to the empirical literature 
looking at how the level of wage bargaining shapes firms’ wage adjustment in different 
European countries (see, e.g., Card and de la Rica, 2006, for Spain, Cardoso and Portugal, 
2005, for Portugal, Gürtzgen, 2009, for Germany, Hartog et al., 2002, for the Netherlands). 
Another strand of the literature looks at the determinants of firm-level agreements in Canada 
and in the United States, emphasizing the role played by inflation or indexation clauses on 
bargained wage adjustments (see, for instance, Christofides and Wilton, 1983, Christofides 
and Stengos, 2003, Rich and Tracy, 2004 and Christofides and Nearchou, 2007). To our 
knowledge, little evidence is available on the determinants of wage floor adjustments 
contained in industry-level agreements in a European country. Avouyi-Dovi et al. (2013) 
provide some empirical evidence on wage bargaining in France combining data on firm- and 
industry-level agreements. However, they focus mainly on the timing at which firms are 
affected by firm- and industry-level wage agreements. Besides, one limitation of their data is 
that information on job-specific wage floors is not available. Thus, they are not able to 
examine the economic determinants of wage floor adjustments. Our contribution is here to 
collect an original data set consisting of the whole wage floor scales for 365 French industries 
and to provide new results on economic determinants of wage floor adjustments. 
Our second contribution is to investigate the interactions between the NMW and industry-
level wage floors adjustments. A large strand of literature examines the effects of the NMW 
either on other wages or on employment (see, e.g., Card and Krueger, 1995 and Neumark and 
Wascher, 2008). In most European countries, the NMW is not only a minimum wage 
threshold binding for all workers, it also affects wage bargaining at different levels and, in 
particular, industry-specific wage floors which then shape individual wage adjustments within 
firms. Here, our contribution is to investigate the spillover effects of the NMW on bargained 
wage floors which are industry and occupation specific. France is an interesting case study 
since a large share of the labor force is directly affected by NMW increases (between 10 and 
15% versus less than 5% in most European countries; see, e.g. Du Caju et al., 2009). Besides 
this direct effect of the NMW on wages close to the NMW, several empirical studies find that 
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minimum wages have spillover effects on higher wages (see, e.g. Grossman, 1983, Card and 
Krueger 1995, Machin et al., 2003, Dickens and Manning, 2004, Neumark and Wascher, 
2004, Gregory, 2015, and Autor et al., 2016). In France, one important channel of 
transmission of NMW increases to other wages may come from industry-level wage 
agreements.2 By law, wage floors cannot be set below the NMW. After a NMW increase, 
industries have to bargain over new values of wage floors to keep the lowest wage floors 
above the NMW. For higher wage floors, unions and employers may want to maintain some 
wage differentials between workers because of fairness or efficiency wage arguments. To 
assess the impact of the NMW on wage floors variations, we use a Tobit model to disentangle 
the effect of the NMW increase on the frequency of wage agreements and on the size of wage 
floor adjustments. We also investigate whether the effect of the NMW is heterogeneous along 
the wage floor distribution.  
Our results are also useful to understand why aggregate real wages have been downward rigid 
in France, in particular during the recent crisis (see, for recent evidence on other European 
countries, Gartner et al., 2013, and Addison et al., 2015). In France, since 2008, real wages 
have been increasing at a rate close to 1% per year whereas the unemployment rate has also 
been rising steadily. An explanation of the small cyclical variations of wages relies on the 
existence of strong nominal and real wage rigidities which prevent wages from adjusting to 
shocks in the short run (see Le Bihan et al., 2012 for evidence using French firm-level wage 
data). Here, we investigate the relevance of wage bargaining as one source of potential wage 
rigidity. Wage bargaining institutions play a role in shaping nominal and real wage rigidity 
since wage agreements allow firms and workers to incorporate (or not) specific and common 
shocks into updated wages. Using firm-level data and combining information on the timing of 
both firm- and industry-level agreements, Avouyi-Dovi et al. (2013) assess to which extent 
predictions of wage rigidity models used in macro models are empirically relevant. Using our 
detailed information on individual wage floors, we here investigate the degree of wage 
rigidity of wage floors and how these wage floors react to usual determinants of wages and 
business cycle conditions.  
                                                     
2
 Using experimental data, Dittrich et al. (2014) show that wage bargaining is a possible channel through which 
NMW spillover effects might arise.  
5 
 
2. Institutional features of the industry-level wage bargaining 
in France 
Institutions of collective wage bargaining in France are quite similar to those observed in 
other European countries. In particular, wages are bargained at different levels. At the 
national level, a binding national minimum wage (NMW) is set by the government. At the 
industry level, employers’ organisations and unions bargain on occupation-specific wage 
floors and firms cannot opt out of an industry-level agreement. At the firm level, employers 
and unions bargain on wage increases provided that wages are set above the industry wage 
floors (see Boeri, 2015, for a discussion of the effects of such a two-tier bargaining system).3 
This section presents the main institutional features of the wage floor bargaining process at 
the industry level.  
2.1 Contractual industries and wage floors 
Firms are classified into different “contractual industries” (“branches conventionnelles” in 
French) depending mainly on their activity (possibly combined with a geographical 
criterion).4 The definition of a “contractual industry” is determined by employers and unions’ 
requests and its existence may depend on historical or geographical reasons. The French 
Ministry of Labor is in charge of enforcing this system, in particular of ensuring that firms are 
correctly classified in their actual contractual industry. There are more than 700 different 
“contractual industries” in France. However, just over 300 industries cover more than 5,000 
workers and small industries rarely bargain on wages. 
For each contractual industry, a general collective agreement (“convention collective” in 
French) defines general rules and principles governing industrial relations between employees 
and employers within the industry, like wage bargaining, working conditions, duration of 
working hours, lay-off conditions, union rights, etc. It defines in particular an industry-
specific classification of representative occupations; this classification is generally based on 
many criteria such as worker skills, job requirements, experience, age or qualifications 
required for the job. All workers in the industry are assigned to one position in this job 
classification. A wage floor is set for every position and workers assigned to a given position 
                                                     
3
 We do not examine here firm-level agreements since our aim is to describe the wage floor adjustment process 
in industry-level agreements and also because information on the size of wage adjustments in firm-level 
agreements is not available (see Avouyi-Dovi et al., 2013 for details on the interaction between firm and 
industry-level agreement occurrence). 
4
 These contractual industries have a different coverage than usual classifications of economic activities (for 
instance, the NACE classification). Thus they cannot be exactly matched with usual classifications of 
economic activities. 
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cannot be paid below the corresponding industry-specific wage floor. The set of all wage 
floors is denoted as the industry-level scale of wage floors. We provide two examples of job 
classification and corresponding wage floors in 2014 for “Hairdressing” and for “Manufacture 
of paper and paperboard”, in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
By law, contractual industries must open a bargaining process on wage floors at least once 
every year but there is no legal obligation to reach an agreement at the end of the bargaining 
process. When parties fail to reach an agreement, it delays the agreement signing and the 
duration between two successive agreements can be larger than one year. Obviously, 
industries are also free to bargain on wages several times during a year, which can induce 
smaller durations between two successive agreements. One important outcome of wage 
bargaining is the definition of new values for wage floors. In the absence of any new 
agreement, wage floors remain unchanged until the next agreement and an agreement does 
not define any explicit contract duration (as it may be the case in Spain for instance). Once an 
agreement is signed by unions and employers’ associations, industry-level wage agreements 
are automatically extended by decision of the Ministry of Labor to all firms belonging to the 
corresponding contractual industry. Those extensions are generally quickly implemented. One 
consequence is that a large majority of workers are covered by industry-level wage 
agreements. Contrary to some European countries (like Germany), there is no opt-out 
possibilities for French firms and industry-level wage floors are binding for all firms in the 
industry. Finally, the agreement sets the date at which this new scale of wage floors should be 
enforced, this date can be slightly different from the date of signature of the agreement.  
2.2 Timing and magnitude of wage floor adjustments  
Two margins of wage floor adjustments can be considered: their timing (i.e. the extensive 
margin) and their magnitude (i.e., the intensive margin). The timing of wage floor 
adjustments is directly related to the frequency of wage agreements. Industry-level wage 
bargaining is not a continuous process since it involves the costs of gathering and sharing 
information and coordination of unions and employers. The size of wage adjustments may 
reflect macroeconomic or sector-specific shocks on different wage floor levels within the 
same industry. This section presents the main mechanisms linking macro variables and the 
margins of wage floor adjustments. We focus first on the specific role of the NMW, and then 
we discuss the potential effects of other determinants. 
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a) The role of the NMW 
The binding national minimum wage (in French, SMIC for Salaire Minimum 
Interprofessionnel de Croissance) is expected to shape the wage floor adjustment process 
since it defines a legal wage floor for all French workers. NMW increases directly affect 
wages of about 10 to 15% of workers. The NMW is automatically adjusted every year, on 
July 1st until 2009 and on January 1st since 2010. This annual frequency of NMW adjustments 
is expected to induce some synchronisation of industry-level wage agreements around the 
month of the NMW increase (in particular in low-wage industries) and should affect the 
extensive margin of wage floor adjustment. NMW increases are decided by the Ministry of 
Labor following an explicit and legal rule:  
∆NMW = max
0, ∆ +


max
∆W − ∆, 0 + ε  (1) 
where ∆ is the NMW increase over the year, ∆ is the inflation rate, ∆W is the 
increase in blue-collar hourly base wage and ε is a possible discretionary governmental 
additional increase.5 Over the period 2007-2015, only one discretionary increase (+0.6%) was 
implemented in July 2012 (just after François Hollande was elected as Président de la 
République).  
The NMW can affect wage floor adjustments through different channels. First, the NMW can 
be set above the lowest wage floors previously defined in industry-level agreements. There is 
no strict obligation for industries to update immediately wage floors that are below the 
NMW.6 However, in that case, they have strong incentives to bargain on wage floors and 
adjust them accordingly since wage floors below the NMW become irrelevant for actual wage 
setting. Moreover, unions and firms’ representatives receive strong recommendations from 
the Ministry of Labor to open new industry-level wage negotiations and update their lowest 
wage floors. When industries have all their wage floors above the NMW, they are said to 
comply with the NMW.  
Second, wage floors above the NMW might also be affected through spillover effects. 
Different theoretical explanations rationalise these spillover effects at the firm level and may 
be extended to the case of industries. Using an efficiency wage model, Grossman (1983) 
                                                     
5
 Besides, if during the year, the inflation rate is higher than 2% since the last NMW adjustment, the NMW is 
automatically and immediately adjusted (this happened in May 2008 and in December 2011).  
6
 No worker can be paid below the NMW (even if a worker is covered by an industry-level wage floor below the 
NMW) and actual wages below the NMW must be adjusted with no delay to the new value of the NMW.  
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shows that after a NMW increase, the wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers 
becomes smaller and firms have to increase wages of skilled (high-wage) workers in order to 
avoid a reduction in the effort of skilled workers. Another potential explanation is that a 
NMW increase may shift the labor demand of relative skilled workers, which results in higher 
wages for skilled workers. Manning (2003) also shows that if firms used to pay high wages to 
attract better workers from the low-wage firms, these firms have to increase their wages after 
a NMW increase if they want to keep on hiring better workers.7 These spillover effects may 
be heterogeneous because industries cannot uniformly increase all wages after a NMW 
increase. In this case, NMW increases should result in a lower dispersion of wage floors. 
These spillover effects will mainly affect the intensive margin of wage floor adjustments.  
b) Other determinants 
Wage floors are set for every occupation in the industry-specific job classification and are 
constrained by the NMW. These wage floors can be seen as wages that would be set by a 
representative firm for some representative occupations. So, wage floor adjustments might 
depend on the usual determinants of wage inflation that are considered in most macro 
empirical analyses (see Blanchard and Katz, 1999, and Gali, 2011, for theoretical 
foundations), i.e. the inflation rate, the unemployment rate and/or a measure of productivity. 
However, besides the role played by NMW adjustments, the standard wage inflation equation 
should be adapted to examine the adjustment of industry-level wage floors for at least two 
reasons, namely infrequent wage bargaining and possible interactions between wage floors 
and actual wages.  
First, the wage floor adjustment is not a continuous process over time since it depends on the 
infrequent signing of an agreement at the industry level. Hence wage floor changes should be 
considered with respect to the last date they were changed. Usual determinants of wage 
adjustments, like inflation or variations in productivity, should also be introduced with respect 
to the date of the last wage floor adjustment, and not at a fixed quarterly or annual frequency 
(see Figure A in the Appendix).8 Moreover, the usual determinants of wage floor adjustments 
may also affect the timing of wage agreements. For instance, unions are more likely to ask for 
opening wage negotiations in periods of high productivity gains.  
                                                     
7
 Predictions of this model can be transposed to industries competing with each other. 
8
 We here leave aside considerations related to expected inflation or productivity since industry-specific 
measures of price or wage expectations are not available.  
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Second, in standard wage inflation equations, actual aggregate or individual wages are 
generally considered whereas here we examine industry-level wage floors that could interact 
with actual wages. In particular, past changes in actual industry-specific wages may affect 
wage floor updates when they are renegotiated. For instance, a large increase in actual wages 
in the industry (regardless of the previous wage agreement) could lead unions to adjust wage 
floors upwards. This adjustment would be rationalised by fairness issues (Falk et al., 2006). 
This increase in industry-level wages may be due to productivity gains in the industry but also 
related to some exogenous wage increases in the largest firms of this industry (determined by 
a firm-level agreement, for instance). In this case, employers’ associations might agree with a 
wage floor adjustment, in particular if they want to prevent potential competitors from 
maintaining low wages and obtaining a substantial competitive advantage (Haucap et al. 
2001).  
3. Data on industry-level wage floors  
Our data set contains a little more than 50,000 individual bargained different wage floors 
(defined at the occupational level) in the 365 biggest “contractual” industries (among a little 
more than 700 industries in France). For those 365 industries, we have collected all wage 
agreements over the period 2007-2015 available on a government website (Legifrance).9 This 
data set is to our knowledge the first one containing such detailed information on wage floors 
negotiated within industries. Table 2 provides some simple statistics on these industries. The 
number of employees covered by a “contractual” industry varies a lot: in our sample, seven 
industries cover more than 350,000 employees (for instance, the wholesale food industry, 
hotels and restaurants, and car services), but 25% of industries cover less than 5,500 
employees. Overall, industries in our dataset cover about 12 million employees, i.e., about 
75% of workers in the private sector. Many industries included in our dataset have a national 
coverage (207 industries). In the metalworking sector, wage floors of non-managerial 
employees are bargained at the local level: about 76 local different wage scales coexist at the 
département10 level but they all use the same classification of job occupations. In three 
sectors, i.e., ‘public works’, ‘quarry and metal’, and ‘construction’, wage floors for non-
managerial employees are bargained at the regional level (an administrative région consists of 
                                                     
9
 http://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechConvColl.do 
10
 A département is an administrative area. There are 96 départements in France. Each of them has 
approximately the same geographical size (6,000 km2), but different populations.  
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several départements): about 81 regional different wage scales coexist and for each of those 3 
sectors job classifications are similar. 
[Insert Table 2] 
The typical wage agreement contains the date (day/month/year) when the agreement was 
signed, the date at which it is enforced,11 the name of unions that have signed the agreement, 
and the scale of wage floors (corresponding to wage floors for all occupations in a given 
industry). Wage floors can be defined as hourly, monthly, or yearly base wages (gross wages 
in euros, i.e., excluding employer social security contributions but including employee social 
security contributions). They exclude bonuses and other fringe benefits. We also exclude 
wage levels or planned wage increases that are only based either on seniority or explicit 
seniority indexation rules defined in the agreement.  
Each scale of wage floors is specific to a job classification defined at the industry level. Thus 
the number of wage floors contained in wage agreements can vary across industries. On 
average, industry-level scales of wage floors contain 21 different wage floors corresponding 
to different job occupations (Table 2).12 The average wage gap between two wage floors in a 
given scale of wage floors is about 5.7%. This average wage differential is much smaller in 
the first half of the wage floor scale (close to 2%) whereas the average differential is 9.5% at 
the top of the distribution.13 Finally, the average wage floor over the sample period is about 
2,000 euros. When we compare average actual wages and average wage floors by industry, 
the average wage differential is about 40% and wage floors and actual average wages are 
highly correlated across industries.14  
Using our data set, we are able to compute the aggregate annual growth rate of wage floors 
stipulated by industry-level wage agreements. For that purpose, we calculate the year-on-year 
wage change for each wage floor over the sample period. Figure 1 plots the average annual 
growth of wage floors. First, the aggregate wage floor increase is close to but below the 
aggregate base wage published by the Ministry of Labor since actual wage changes may also 
                                                     
11
 There is no explicit definition of contract duration like in Spain for instance. The new wage floor classification 
remains the same until the next wage agreement. 
12
 All statistics are weighted using the number of workers by industry or the number of workers by position in 
the industry job classification. See the data appendix for details on calculations of the number of workers and 
employment weights. 
13
 The top of the wage floor scale consists of wage floors above the median of wage floors in a given job 
classification.  
14
 See Figure B in Appendix for further details on the sectoral correlation between wage floors and actual wages. 
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include firm-level and individual wage increases. Second, aggregate variations of wage floors 
are also highly correlated to the actual aggregate wage increase. Third, in real terms, the 
aggregate wage floor increase is +0.4% on average while the output gap has been negative 
since 2008; this positive real growth of wage floors is mainly driven by low inflation periods. 
Lastly, there is a correlation between the annual growth of wage floors and NMW variations. 
In particular, when the NMW increased by more than 2% in 2008 and 2012, the gap between 
the annual growth of wage floors and the actual aggregate wage growth fell close to 0. 
[Insert Figure 1] 
Figure 2 reports the distribution of the year-on-year wage floor changes (calculated in Q4). 
First, there is no nominal wage decrease in industry wage agreements. Second, there is a peak 
at zero corresponding to industries where there is either no agreement or where wage floors 
do not change: over the sample period, between 15 and 35% of wage floors are not modified 
in a given year. This peak is much higher in periods of low inflation (in particular during the 
recent period). Third, these distributions exhibit some peaks exactly equal or close to the 
NMW increase or to past inflation, revealing some real rigidity of wage floors. For instance, 
in 2011, we observe two peaks in the distribution, at 1.5 and 2%, while the NMW increase 
was about 1.5% and inflation was 2%. During the recent low inflation period, the distribution 
of changes is much less dispersed. In 2015, there is a peak in the distribution around 0.75% 
which corresponds to the NMW increase (while the inflation rate was about 0%).  
[Insert Figure 2] 
4. An	empirical model for wage floor adjustment 
Our aim is to investigate empirically the main determinants of industry-level wage 
agreements and wage floor adjustments. These determinants include inflation, NMW 
increases, overall sectoral wage increases and variables capturing productivity shocks or 
business cycle position (as mentioned in Section 2).  
4.1 The empirical model 
The estimated model is a Tobit-II type model which takes into account the discretionary 
process of wage bargaining. The first equation corresponds to a Probit model where the 
dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if there is a wage agreement in industry j 
at date t, 0 otherwise. Our baseline Probit model can be written as follows: 
12 
 

∗ =  + ∆ !, + "∆ !, + #∆ !,
$ + %∆ !,
&
 + '( +
)* + +, + -. + / + 0                   (2) 
if ∗ > 0 then  = 1, 0 otherwise. 
Here   is a dummy variable equal to one if a wage agreement is signed in industry j at date t 
(date in quarter/year format). ∆ !, is the log difference operator between the date of the last 
wage agreement 3 − . (where . is the elapsed duration in quarters since the last agreement in 
industry j) and date t. For instance, ∆ !, =  −  !. This operator allows us to 
compute cumulated variations of macro-variables between the last wage agreement observed 
at date 3 − . and date t, 	is the overall French consumer price index (CPI),  is the 
NMW in real terms (i.e. divided by the consumer price index), and  is an average wage 
index in industry j. The cumulated variation of this variable is taken in real terms and net of 
NMW effects. 15 This variation is then decomposed into an aggregate wage increase common 
to all industries ∆ !,$  (which should be close to the aggregate base wage increase in 
France) and an industry-specific wage increase (which is calculated as ∆ !,& =
∆ !, − ∆ !,
$ ). The log-difference is in this case calculated between date 3 − . 
and one quarter before the agreement (t-1) to reduce the potential simultaneity bias (see the 
next subsection for details). ( is a measure of the local unemployment rate, * is a measure 
of the industry-level output gap and 	, a dummy variable capturing the compliance of wage 
floors with the NMW (this variable is equal to one if at least one of the industry-level wage 
floors is below the NMW just before the industry-level wage agreement, 0 otherwise). 
Besides ., we include three dummy variables corresponding to durations between two 
successive wage agreements16 (equal to 6 months, one year and two years), and / are time 
fixed effects.17 To our best knowledge, average wage indices, output gap or unemployment 
                                                     
15
 To obtain a broad estimation of the effects of the NMW on industry actual wages, we estimate an OLS 
equation relating industry actual wage increases to NMW increases and inflation. Estimated coefficients are 
close to 1 for inflation and 0.5 for the NMW. 
16
 In France, wage agreements do not contain any explicit definition of the contract duration. The wage floor 
classification is not changed until the next agreement. Here, instead of the contract duration, we consider the 
durations between two successive dates of wage agreement enforcements. 
17
 We also introduce an interaction term between ,  and the dummy variable indicating whether date t is before 
or after January 2010 since January 2010 is the date at which the reform modifying the adjustment date of the 
NMW increase was implemented (moving from July to January). 
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measures are not available at the “contractual” industry level. We here compute these 
variables using NACE industry available variables (see data appendix).  
The second equation of the Tobit model relates nominal wage floor increases to macro 
variables such as inflation, the NMW increase (in real terms) and the industry-level actual 
wage increase (in real terms, net of NMW effects) since the last wage agreement. This second 
equation is as follows: 
∆ !,56 = 7 + 8∆ !, + 9∆ !, + :∆ !,
$ + ;∆ !,
&
 + <( +
=* + ℎ? + @ + A + (6                       (3) 
where ∆ !,56 is the nominal change in the bargained wage floor in occupation i and 
industry j between the date of the last wage agreement 3 − . (where . is the elapsed duration 
since the last agreement in industry j) and date t.  
This variable is observed at dates when a new wage agreement is signed, it is missing 
otherwise. Most of the independent variables are the same as in the first equation but, using 
estimates obtained in the first equation, we also calculate a Mills ratio which is specific to 
each industry and which is denoted ?, based on exclusion restrictions detailed in the 
subsection below. Finally, @  is an industry fixed effect and A are date controls. 
In our dataset, wage floor scales are specific to each industry and the number of bargained 
wage floors can be very different across industries. This might raise a technical issue since an 
industry with a very precise job classification will be oversampled (because of its many job 
categories). To control for this issue, we define ten wage categories defined by the ratio of 
each wage floor to the NMW (wage floors less than 1.01 × , wage floors between 
1.01 ×  and 1.03 × , wage floors between 1.03 ×  and 1.07 × , 
wage floors between 1.07 ×  and 1.13 × , wage floors between 1.13 ×  
and 1.21 × , wage floors between 1.21 ×  and 1.32 × , wage floors 
between 1.32 ×  and 	1.48 × , wage floors between 1.48 ×  and 1.70 ×
, wage floors between 1.70 ×  and 2.09 × , wage floors above 2.09 ×
). These thresholds are chosen so that the resulting wage categories contain 
approximately the same number of wage floors. In each category, we select randomly only 
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one wage floor for each industry.18 The sample then consists of a little less than 20,000 
observations (industry × wage category × date) among about 50,000 wage floors.19 Moreover, 
we consider specifications where the NMW effect can vary with the wage floor level. For this 
purpose, we interact the cumulated NMW variable with dummy variables corresponding to 
each wage category. 
The Tobit model is estimated using a two-step estimation procedure and standard deviations 
of estimators are obtained using block bootstrap simulations by industry. This method allows 
us to obtain consistent estimates of the standard errors (i.e., they account for the potential 
correlation between wage floors within the same industry). This method was preferred to 
direct clustering to deal with the Tobit model structure. 
4.2 Identification and endogeneity issues 
We address now several important identification issues, namely the lack of individual 
variations of some variables which are macro variables and potential collinearity among them. 
Our aim is here to assess the effect of some variables (NMW or inflation variations) that are 
by definition not industry-specific but macro. Thus, the identification of the impact of such 
variables relies only on their temporal variability. In our model, industries bargain on wages 
infrequently. Consequently, we can expect that bargaining parties (workers’ unions and 
employers’ associations) incorporate into the updated wage floors, not the change in macro 
variables at the date of agreement, but rather the cumulated changes in macro variables since 
the last wage industry agreement. Using the cross-section variability of cumulated changes in 
macro variables since the last wage agreement allows us to widen the support of the 
distribution of changes in macro variables. This strategy should help us to identify the effects 
of macro variables on wage floors because cumulated variations are now industry-specific. 
This line of reasoning is valid for the NMW but also for the CPI and sectoral actual wages for 
which we also consider log-variations between two successive wage agreements. 
Another identification issue stems from potential collinearities among macro variables. This 
might be particularly true for inflation and NMW increases: an increase in the inflation rate 
has a mechanical positive impact on the NMW increase since the formula used to adjust the 
NMW incorporates past inflation. Reciprocally, part of the effect of inflation might stem from 
                                                     
18
 We choose this procedure instead of weighted regressions because weighted regressions would strongly reduce 
the data variability needed for the identification. Weighting would generate a large discrepancy between large 
industries/worker categories and small ones.  
19
 Robustness checks have been run using the whole dataset. Results remain quite similar. 
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NMW increases. A similar issue may arise from the correlation between inflation and 
industry-specific wage variations. We thus consider a model in which all macroeconomic 
variables are taken in real terms in order to isolate the specific effect of inflation. Secondly, 
the growth rate of industry-specific wages (in real terms) may also capture the pass-through of 
the NMW into industry actual wages (through individual wage increases or firm-level 
agreements). To control for this, we introduce as covariates the cumulated wage increase in a 
given industry in real terms and we control for the possible NMW effects. Here again, the aim 
of this variable transformation is to isolate the specific impact of each macro variable. 
A third issue is the possible simultaneity bias which results from the inclusion of the growth 
rate of industry-specific actual wages in the list of explanatory variables. In fact, we could 
expect wage floor increases to be instantaneously transmitted to actual wages. We address this 
issue by considering the cumulated variation of industry-specific wages (in real terms) 
between the date of the previous agreement and date t-1 (instead of date t). Doing so, we 
remove from the cumulated actual wage evolution the wage change observed during the last 
quarter (between t-1 and t) because it is the quarter which is the most likely affected by the 
simultaneity bias when wage floors are updated at date t. Note that, by construction, the wage 
increase induced by the previous agreement is not included in the cumulated actual wage 
variation between this agreement and date t-1.  
The identification of the Tobit model comes from the following assumptions. First, we 
assume that the duration elapsed since the last agreement has no direct effect on the size of the 
wage floor adjustment besides the impact of cumulated macro variables introduced in the 
model. Second, we argue that durations equal to one or two years correspond to calendar or 
seasonal effects (related to negotiation costs or legal constraints), independent of the decision 
about the size of wage adjustments. Third, the compliance to the NMW is supposed not to 
affect directly the size of wage floor adjustments since the cumulated increase in the NMW 
already captures the adjustment of previous wage floors to the new ones. Compliance has no 
direct effect on the size of wage floor increases besides the direct effect of the cumulated 
NMW variable. It only affects incentives to reach a new wage agreement. These arguments 
yield the exclusion restrictions that insure identification of the Tobit model. Dummy variables 
for durations exactly equal to six months, one year and two years, and the dummy variable 
indicating that “all wage floors in an industry comply with the NMW” (i.e. the compliance 
with the NMW) are included in equation (2) and excluded from equation (3) since they only 
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affect the timing of the industry-level wage bargaining process, but not the size of wage floor 
adjustments.  
5. Results	
This section reports the results of our estimations. 
5.1 Frequency of industry-level agreements 
Table 3 reports marginal effects of Probit models in which the dependent variable is a dummy 
variable for the enforcement of a wage agreement.20 We run two different specifications where 
we include or not the dummy “non-compliance with the NMW” in order to assess the overall 
effect of the NMW on the frequency of wage agreements. We also report results concerning 
different groups of industries, namely national industries with a high proportion of minimum-
wage workers, national industries with a low proportion of minimum-wage workers, local 
metalworking industries (where the proportion of minimum-wage workers is very low) and 
regional construction and public works industries (where the proportion of NMW workers is 
slightly lower than the average).  
[Insert Table 3] 
First, duration effects are quite substantial and statistically significant: the probability of a 
wage agreement after exactly one year is higher by 33 percentage points (pp) (by comparison, 
the average quarterly frequency of agreement is about 20%). A similar but smaller effect (17 
pp) is obtained for wage agreements signed after exactly two years.21 This reflects the strong 
time dependence of wage agreements, which might be due to important negotiation costs and 
which may be related to the obligation for each industry to bargain on wages at least once a 
year.  
Seasonal effects are other important factors contributing to the variations in the probability of 
a wage agreement. We plot parameter estimates associated with date dummies on Figure 3 
(2015Q4 is the reference). We find that wage agreements are quite staggered before 2010 
(with small peaks in the first and the third quarters) but highly clustered around the first 
quarter after 2010. After 2010, the probability of observing a wage agreement during the first 
quarter is higher (about +10 pp) whereas it is much smaller during the last quarter of the 
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 See Table A in Appendix for results of a Probit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy variable 
indicating the date of the wage agreement signing. Results are broadly similar. 
21
 See Figure C in Appendix for the distribution of durations between two wage agreements.  
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year.22 This result is related to the 2010 reform relative to the timing of NMW increases which 
moved the month of the usual NMW adjustment from July to January. Before 2010, 26% of 
wage agreements were implemented during the third quarter whereas, after 2010, most 
enforcement dates of wage agreements occurred in the first quarter (about 60%) (see Figure E 
in Appendix). Duration and seasonal effects are consistent with predictions of bounded 
rationality models:23 employers and unions may react to salient and large observable shocks 
(such as NMW increases which are publicly announced by the government). 
[Insert Figure 3] 
In some industries, an increase in the NMW may make it higher than some wage floors, 
which might exert some specific pressures on these industries to update their wage scales.24 
The dummy variable capturing the compliance of wage floors with the NMW indeed has a 
positive effect on the probability that an agreement will come into force. This effect is greater 
after 2010 than before 2010. If we exclude this dummy variable, the marginal effect of the 
cumulated NMW increases by 0.5 pp (Table 3), suggesting that we capture here a specific 
channel for the transmission of the NMW increase to the frequency of wage agreements. 
When considering different types of industries, we find higher effects of the compliance 
indicator in industries with a large proportion of low-paid workers and in metalworking 
industries. 
The NMW may affect directly the probability of a wage agreement since it is an important 
reference for low-paid workers. Thus, increases in the NMW might have a positive impact on 
the probability of revising the wage scale. However, the empirical effect of the cumulated real 
NMW increase on the probability of a wage agreement is rather limited (about 2 pp). This 
effect is heterogeneous across industries: the impact of a real NMW increase is much higher 
for industries with a high share of minimum-wage workers (3.5 pp) than for industries with a 
low share of minimum-wage workers (about 1 pp).  
Cumulated increases in the inflation rate and in the aggregate base wage have both a greater 
effect than the real NMW increase on the probability of an industry-level wage agreement. 
Marginal effects associated with inflation or aggregate base real wages are similar, between 6 
                                                     
22
 Similar results are obtained using the date of the wage agreement signing (see Figure D in Appendix). 
23
 For instance, Alvarez et al. (2011) suggest that when there is a large “information cost” to observe variations 
of the economic environment, it is optimal to reset prices at discrete pre-set intervals. 
24
 Figure F in Appendix plots the proportion of industries having at least one wage floor below the NMW over 
time, the frequency of wage agreements and the NMW increases.  
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and 7 pp (Table 3). This result is consistent with the fact that workers are more likely to claim 
for opening a new negotiation if they observe a higher level of inflation (which reduces the 
workers’ purchasing power) or an increase in average aggregate wages (which might induce a 
decrease in industry-relative wages).  
An industry-specific real wage increase seems to have only a small and barely significant 
effect on the dates of agreements. This result suggests that industry-specific productivity 
developments (that would have been captured by this variable) have no impact on the 
occurrence of signing a wage agreement. Similarly, the sectoral output gap and the 
unemployment rate have no significant effect on the occurrence of a wage agreement (one 
exception is the group of industries with a low share of NMW workers).  
5.2 Size of wage floor changes 
Table 4 reports parameter estimates of the second equation of our Tobit model which focuses 
on the determinants of the size of wage floor adjustments. Separate regressions have been run 
for different groups of industries, i.e., all industries, national industries with a high proportion 
of minimum-wage workers, national industries with a low proportion of minimum-wage 
workers, local metalworking industries and regional construction and public works industries.  
[Insert Table 4] 
First, the Mills ratio has a small but significant negative effect. This negative sign has the 
following interpretation: if an exogenous (negative) shock delays the signing of a wage 
agreement, the wage adjustment contained in the agreement will be larger, all other 
observable things being equal.  
The most important determinant of the size of wage floor adjustments is the cumulated 
inflation. The elasticity of wage floor adjustments with respect to cumulated inflation is close 
to 0.6 (Table 4). This result suggests that wage floors are partly indexed to past inflation. 
Here, part of this indexation might stem from either a “direct” inflation effect, or from more 
“indirect” effects resulting either from the NMW indexation to past inflation or from 
aggregate base wage indexation to past inflation. Our model cannot fully disentangle these 
two types of effects. The elasticity of 0.6 should be interpreted as the overall impact of 
inflation on nominal variations of wage floors. Moreover, we find that this degree of 
indexation to inflation is much larger in industries with a high proportion of minimum-wage 
workers (elasticity of 0.59) than in industries with a low proportion of minimum-wage 
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workers (0.44). In local metalworking and construction industries, the elasticities of wage 
floor adjustments to inflation are even higher (0.74 and 0.63).  
Second, the cumulated real NMW variation has a positive and significant effect on the size of 
wage floor adjustments; on average, in a given industry, an increase of 1% in the NMW (in 
real terms) will increase wage floors by 0.24 pp. When we consider the heterogeneity of this 
effect across industries, the NMW has a larger effect on wage floors in industries with a high 
proportion of minimum-wage workers and in construction industries (elasticities of 0.3) than 
in industries with a low proportion of minimum-wage workers (elasticity of 0.26), and in 
metalworking industries where the proportion of minimum-wage workers is close to 0 
(elasticity of 0.14). However, in all groups of industries, the effect of the NMW is significant 
even when the proportion of minimum-wage workers is very low, which suggests the 
existence of NMW spillover effects.  
Contrary to what we observe for the occurrence of wage agreements, the cumulative 
aggregate real wage variation plays a limited role on the size of wage floor adjustments. Its 
effect is significant but small (elasticity of 0.18). Industry-specific real wage variations have a 
similar impact on the size of wage floor changes (elasticity of 0.22) and play a role in 
determining a new scale of wage floors. Considering the heterogeneity of these effects across 
industries (Table 4), we observe that the effect of industry-specific wage changes is larger in 
industries with a low proportion of minimum-wage workers. The elasticity of wage floor 
changes with respect to sectoral wage changes is 0.32 in industries with a low proportion of 
minimum-wage workers and 0.58 in metalworking industries, whereas it is small and not 
significant in industries with a high proportion of minimum-wage workers.25 In the same way, 
aggregate cumulated wage change plays a larger role in industries with a high proportion of 
minimum-wage workers than in other industries. This result might suggest that industries 
where the NMW is less binding have much more leeway to take into account the industry-
specific wage or productivity developments. Lastly, the sectoral output gap measure and the 
local unemployment rate have no significant or very small effect on the size of wage floor 
changes. This finding suggests that business cycle conditions play only a limited role on 
industry-level wage adjustment. However, this result might also come at least partly, from 
measurement errors in our proxy for business cycle conditions of “contractual” industries.  
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 Table B in the Appendix also reports results according to the firm size composition of industries. Differences 
are small and not significant.  
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[Insert Figure 4] 
Finally, we test whether the impact of NMW increases varies along the wage floor 
distribution and examine the NMW spillover effects along this distribution.26 Figure 4 reports 
estimated parameters associated with the variables representing interactions between 
cumulated real NMW variations and dummy variables capturing the different effects along 
the wage floor distribution. As expected, these parameter estimates decrease along the wage 
floor distribution, from 0.46 for wage floors close to the NMW to 0.16 for wage floors above 
twice the NMW. One interesting result is that the NMW effect is significant all along the 
wage floor distribution. It decreases quickly from the lowest wage floor to wage floors equal 
to 1.1 × . However, we find that NMW real variations have a positive effect on wage 
floor adjustments for all levels of wage floors.  
We then test whether other macro variables have such heterogeneous effects along the wage 
distribution. We find that only inflation has such a heterogeneous effect. Figure 5 reports 
elasticities of wage floor variations obtained with respect to both real NMW variations and 
inflation along the wage floor distribution. In particular, we find that the elasticity of wage 
floor changes with respect to inflation is very high for wage floors close to the NMW (close 
to 0.8) and then decreases steadily (0.6 for wage floors close to 1.1 × , about 0.5 for 
wages above 2 × ). This elasticity is positive and significant for all levels of wage 
floors. This decreasing slope is very similar to the one obtained for the NMW.  
[Insert Figure 5] 
Some separate regressions run on different groups of industries show some heterogeneity 
across industries (Figure G in the Appendix). All along the wage distribution, the NMW 
effect is a little larger in industries with a high share of minimum-wage workers than in 
industries with a low proportion of minimum-wage workers and in metalworking industries. 
Moreover, the NMW effect is positive and significant all along the wage floor distribution, 
not only in industries with a high proportion of minimum-wage workers but also in industries 
with a low proportion of minimum-wage workers. Regarding the elasticity of wage floor 
changes with respect to inflation, differences are much larger. This elasticity is close to 1 for 
low wages in industries with a high proportion of minimum-wage workers and the slope is 
slightly decreasing towards 0.7 for higher wage floors. A similar pattern appears for 
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 Wage growth is substantially different across wage floors: 30% of the total variance is explained by 
differences across occupations within the same industry (see Table C in the Appendix).  
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metalworking industries with still a high elasticity (close to 0.7) for wage floors above 
1.1 × . In industries with a lower proportion of minimum-wage workers, the elasticity 
of wage floors with respect to inflation is close to 0.7 for wage floors close to the NMW and 
decreases towards 0.3 for the highest wage floors. 
We run two other regressions as robustness checks. First, we test whether our results are 
driven by heterogeneity across industries according to the composition of their wage floor 
categories (as defined in section 4). For this purpose, we run a regression restricting our 
sample to industries whose wage classification contains at least 8 of the 10 wage categories 
(more than 60% of industries in our sample). Results are quite similar to those obtained using 
all industries, which suggests that heterogeneity is not due to the wage category composition 
(see Figure H in the Appendix). 
Second, we test whether determinants of wage floor variations differ before and after 2010. 
For this purpose, we introduce interaction terms between macro variables of our Tobit model 
and dummy variables “before 2010” and “after 2010” (see Table D in the Appendix). 
Elasticities with respect to inflation, average aggregate wage and NMW increases are slightly 
changed whereas the effect of sectoral wage variations is more significantly changed. Before 
2010, the industry-specific wage effect is statistically significant and close to 0.5 whereas 
after 2010, the impact of sectoral wage variations becomes non-significant for all 
specifications and for all industries (except construction). The aggregate wage effect remains 
significant but small, especially for industries with a high share of minimum-wage workers. 
This result might suggest that after 2010 (which also corresponds to a recession and a low 
inflation period), industry-level wage agreements might be more constrained by indexation 
and by NMW real increases. In other words, they might be less likely to adjust industry-
specific wage floors to industry-specific conditions.  
6. Conclusion	
Using a detailed data set of thousands of industry-level wage agreements in France over the 
period 2007-2015, our study provides new evidence on the determinants of industry-level 
wage floor adjustments.  
We find that the time schedule of wage agreements is highly seasonal and depends strongly 
on the duration since the last wage agreement. Inflation and sectoral wage increases have also 
a significant impact on the probability of a wage agreement: a reduction of workers’ 
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purchasing power or a drop in industry wages relative to aggregate wages leads to more 
frequent wage agreements. Inflation and past sectoral real wage increases have a larger impact 
on the size of wage floor increases: elasticities of wage floors to these macro variables are 0.6 
and 0.4, respectively. We also find that the effect of inflation is heterogeneous along the wage 
floor distribution: the elasticity of wage floors with respect to inflation is close to 0.8 for the 
lowest wage floors and then decreases steadily to reach 0.4 for the highest wage floors. 
The NMW is another important factor shaping wage-floor setting in industry-level 
agreements. It affects the timing of wage agreements through different channels. First, the 
seasonal timing of wage agreement can be partly linked to the seasonal adjustment of the 
NMW. Second, the signing of a wage agreement is more likely when the scale of wage floors 
does not comply with the NMW in a given industry. Finally, minimum wage increases have a 
small but positive impact on the probability of signing a wage agreement. Moreover, the 
NMW also affects the size of wage floor adjustments: when the real NMW increases by 1%, 
wage floors increase on average by 0.25%. The elasticity of wage floors with respect to real 
NMW variations also decreases along the wage floor distribution but only slowly, from 0.45 
for the lowest wage floors to 0.15 for the highest wage floors.  
Finally, we provide evidence that wage floors present strong downward nominal wage rigidity 
since there are no nominal decreases of wage floors. Besides, we also find a large correlation 
between wage floor adjustments and past inflation or past NMW increases, whereas business 
cycle conditions and local unemployment rates have no impact on wage floor adjustments. 
These results suggest that bargaining institutions can explain - at least partly - the small 
response of aggregate real wages to the rise of unemployment in France during the Great 
Recession. Further research linking dynamics of wage floors and firm-level wages should 
help to understand to which extent wage bargaining institutions (including their interactions 
with the NMW) might have shaped wage dynamics during the recent crisis.  
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Table 1: Examples of minimum wage scales stipulated by industry-level wage 
agreements 
a) Paper and paperboard (30,000 workers) 
 
b) Hairdressing (100,000 workers) 
 
Notes: “Niveau” is the category of workers, most frequently: “I” for routine task occupations or low-skilled 
workers, “II” for higher-skilled workers (technicians for instance)… The highest levels usually represent 
“managers”. “Echelons” are sub categories within a category of workers. The “Coefficient” can be used to 
calculate the wage rate. Classifications of occupations are specific to each industry. The NMW was set at EUR 
1,446 in 2014 (Jan. 1st). 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on industry wage scales 
 
Mean Q1 Median Q3 
Number of employees  32,810 5,343 11,712 27,239 
Number of wage levels 20.8 11 18 28 
Average wage floor (in euro) 2,009 1,496 1,632 2,202 
Average wage differential (%) 5.66 3.35 5.40 7.36 
Average wage differential (%) (at the bottom 
of the wage scale) 2.08 0.35 0.95 2.90 
Average wage differential (%) (at the top of 
the wage scale) 9.46 5.48 8.58 11.33 
Maximum/minimum wage ratio within an 
industry 2.55 1.89 2.34 3.16 
Average gross wage / average wage floor 
(weighted) 1.41 1.34 1.38 1.50 
Notes: The “Number of employees” is calculated using the DADS dataset which reports the number of 
employees in each firm and the “contractual industry” covering the firm (see data appendix). The number of 
wage levels is calculated as the number of different wage floors reported in wage agreements; the statistics are 
weighted by the number of employees by industry. The average wage floor is first calculated by industry; then 
statistics are computed across industries and weighted by the number of employees by industry. The average 
wage differential is calculated as the log difference (in %) between two successive wage floors in the wage scale 
of an industry; the average wage difference is computed by industry. Statistics are then weighted using the 
number of employees by industry. The average wage differential “at the bottom of the wage scale” is calculated 
using only the first half of the wage floor scale whereas ‘at the top of the wage scale’ we use the second half of 
the wage floor scale. The max/min ratio is calculated as the ratio between the minimum wage floor and the 
maximum wage floor in a given industry. The “Average gross wage / average sectoral wage” is calculated as the 
ratio between the actual average gross wage in a given industry (as reported by the Ministry of Labor in 2011) 
and the average weighted wage floor in the same industry (in 2011). Weighted statistics use the number of 
employees by industry. 
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Table 3: Marginal effects of covariates in the Probit model for wage agreement (date of 
enforcement) 
Dependent variable - 
Dummy variable for 
wage agreement 
enforcement 
All industries National coverage Metal 
working 
Construction  
and public 
works 
(1) (2) 
High prop. of 
min. wage 
workers 
Low prop. of 
min. wage 
workers 
   
Cum. inflation 6.386*** (0.618) 
7.534*** 
(0.608) 
6.299*** 
(1.194) 
4.996*** 
(0.899) 
6.525*** 
(1.245) 
8.122*** 
(1.178) 
Cum. real NMW 
change 
2.247*** 
(0.528) 
2.718*** 
(0.551) 
3.525** 
(1.502) 
1.180 
(0.740) 
2.756*** 
(0.977) 
2.546*** 
(0.849) 
Cum. real aggregate  
wage change 
7.152*** 
(1.078) 
8.404*** 
(1.057) 
5.295** 
(2.056) 
7.236*** 
(1.481) 
6.678*** 
(2.249) 
7.678*** 
(1.938) 
Cum. real  
wage change in the 
industry 
3.218* 
(1.730) 
3.406* 
(1.743) 
-1.291 
(2.536) 
1.675 
(2.660) 
4.549 
(6.009) 
-1.522 
(5.935) 
Unemployment rate 0.006 (0.017) 
0.010 
(0.017) 
0.014 
(0.121) 
-0.062* 
(0.033) 
0.033 
(0.26) 
-0.008 
(0.025) 
Output gap 0.187 (0.262) 
0.252 
(0.272) 
-0.323 
(0.707) 
1.111*** 
(0.331) 
-1.128 
(1.152) 
1.105** 
(0.549) 
Duration          
                 6 months 0.047*** (0.016) 
0.044*** 
(0.016) 
0.047* 
(0.025) 
0.049* 
(0.027) 
-0.043** 
(0.021) 
0.148** 
(0.057) 
                 1 year 0.329*** (0.016) 
0.339*** 
(0.013) 
0.257*** 
(0.025) 
0.341*** 
(0.023) 
0.314*** 
(0.022) 
0.320*** 
(0.046) 
                 2 years 0.171*** (0.024) 
0.183*** 
(0.024) 
0.165*** 
(0.046) 
0.173*** 
(0.038) 
0.132** 
(0.060) 
0.150*** 
(0.043) 
Before 2010           
Non-compliance with 
the NMW 
0.013* 
(0.007)  
0.023 
(0.018) 
0.016 
(0.015) 
0.074 
(0.047) 
0.016 
(0.016) 
After 2010          
Non-compliance with 
the NMW 
0.058*** 
(0.007)  
0.060*** 
(0.012) 
0.027** 
(0.011) 
0.111*** 
(0.016) 
0.032** 
(0.017) 
N 12,142 12,142 3,737 4,076 2,733 2,655 
Note: This table reports marginal effects estimated with Probit models. Date and industry dummies are included 
(estimates corresponding to date dummies of specification (1) are presented in Figure 3). Standard errors are 
obtained using bootstrap methods and are reported in brackets. The dependent variable is the dummy variable 
equal to 1 if there is a wage agreement in industry j at date t (quarter-year). Estimates in the column “High prop. 
of min. wage workers” are obtained for the subsample of industries with a national coverage and with a 
proportion of minimum-wage workers higher than the median among all industries. Estimates in the column 
“Low prop. of min. wage workers” are obtained for the subsample of industries with a national coverage and 
with a proportion of minimum-wage workers smaller than the median among all industries. Estimates in the 
column “Metalworking” are obtained for the subsample containing local metalworking industries. Estimates in 
the column “Construction and public works” are obtained for the subsample containing regional construction and 
public works industries. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
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Table 4: Parameter estimates of the Tobit model – Wage floor changes 
Dependent 
variable : Nominal 
wage floor changes 
All 
industries National coverage 
Metal 
working  
Construction 
and public 
works 
 
High prop. of 
min. wage 
workers 
Low prop. of 
min. wage 
workers 
 
 
Cumulated inflation 0.590*** (0.029) 
0.588*** 
(0.049) 
0.443*** 
(0.061) 
0.742*** 
(0.056) 
0.635*** 
(0.073) 
Cumulated real 
NMW change 
0.241*** 
(0.023) 
0.310*** 
(0.053) 
0.262*** 
(0.053) 
0.139*** 
(0.039) 
0.295*** 
(0.053) 
Cumulated real 
aggregate wage 
change 
0.179*** 
(0.043) 
0.213*** 
(0.065) 
0.161 
(0.109) 
0.120 
(0.093) 
0.192** 
(0.078) 
Cumulated real 
wage change in the 
industry 
0.222*** 
(0.084) 
-0.098 
(0.120) 
0.315** 
(0.142) 
0.576** 
(0.233) 
1.208*** 
(0.377) 
Unemployment rate 0.000 (0.001) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.004 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Output gap 0.026** (0.011) 
-0.004 
(0.022) 
0.004 
(0.031) 
-0.014 
(0.052) 
-0.023 
(0.024) 
Mills Ratio 
-0.001*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
R2 0.578 0.538 0.525 0.675 0.818 
N 19,711 6,516 5,009 5,262 2,924 
Time dummies Date Date Date Date Date 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is the nominal wage floor change between two successive effects of wage 
agreements in a given industry. Estimates in the column “All” concern all industries in our sample (national 
coverage industries, metalworking industries (with a local level coverage) and construction and public work 
industries (regional coverage). Estimates in the column “High prop. of min. wage workers” are based on the 
subsample of industries with a national coverage and with a proportion of minimum-wage workers higher than the 
median among all industries. Estimates in the column “Low prop. of min. wage workers” are based on the 
subsample of industries with a national coverage and with a proportion of minimum-wage workers smaller than 
the median among all industries. Estimates in the column “Metalworking” are based on the subsample containing 
local metalworking industries. Estimates in the column “Construction and public works” are based on the 
subsample containing regional construction and public works industries. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 
0.05, * p < 0.1 
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Figure 1: Average size of wage changes in industry-level wage agreements (2007-2015)  
Notes: The average wage increase in industry agreement is computed as a weighted (using the number of 
employees by job category in each industry) average of all wage increases stipulated in industry agreement at a 
given date (year/quarter). The overall wage increase is the annual increase in the aggregate actual wage index 
(SMB – source: DARES). NMW is the NMW increase at an annual frequency (source: INSEE). Inflation is the 
overall CPI annual growth (source: INSEE). 
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Figure 2: Distribution of wage floors variations between two wage agreement 
enforcements 
2007-2009 
 
2010-2012 
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2013-2015 
 
Notes: this figure plots the distribution of wage changes between two dates of industry-level agreement 
enforcements for all industries in our sample. Annual wage variations are calculated during the last quarter of a 
given year. Distributions are weighted by the number of employees by job category by industry.  
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Figure 3: Estimates of time effects in Probit regression  
 
Notes: These figures report parameter estimates (black solid line) and 95%-confidence interval (black dashed 
lines) associated with date dummies used as time controls in the Probit regressions (equation 2) (results are 
presented in Table 3 (specification (1)). Q42015 is chosen as the reference quarter. 
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Figure 4: Elasticity of wage floor increases with respect to the real NMW increases along 
the wage floor distribution 
 
 
Notes: this figure reports parameter estimates obtained by adding to our baseline Tobit model interaction terms 
(dummy variables) which capture the relative position of a wage floor along the wage distribution. This relative 
position is calculated with reference to the NMW level. The black line reports elasticities of the nominal wage 
floors with respect to NMW increases (in real terms); the dashed lines represent the 95%-confidence interval. 
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Figure 5: Elasticity of wage floor variations with respect to inflation along the wage floor 
distribution  
 
Notes: this figure reports parameter estimates obtained by adding to our baseline Tobit model interaction terms 
(dummy variables) which capture the relative position of a wage floor along the wage distribution. This relative 
position is calculated with reference to the NMW level. The grey lines report elasticities of nominal wage floors 
with respect to inflation. The dashed lines represent the 95%-confidence interval. 
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APPENDIX (not intended to be published) 
Data Appendix 
This appendix gives more details on how complementary industry-level variables (like the 
number of employees, wages and unemployment) are obtained.  
- Number of employees by “contractual” industry 
We compute the number of workers covered by every industry using an exhaustive 
administrative firm level data set (“DADS fichier détail”) containing for every firm, the 
number of employees belonging to a “contractual” industry (in year 2009). We then calculate 
the sum of employees by industry. We use the number of employees by industry to compute 
statistics such as the frequency of wage agreements. 
- Number of employees by job classification category 
To compute the number of employees by category of the job classification, we use the total 
number of employees by “contractual” industry (see above) and information from the 
Ministry of Labor on the distribution of workers along the wage distribution in every 
“contractual” industry. The Ministry of Labor publishes some summary statistics for each of 
the biggest 250 industries,27 in particular the share of workers whose actual wages belong to 
one of the 12 wage categories defined by the ratio of actual wages to the NMW (wages less 
than 1.05*NMW, wages between 1.05*NMW and 1.1 NMW….). Using the total number of 
workers per industry in year 2011, we are able to compute the number of employees by wage 
category. For industries which are not present in summary statistics of the Ministry of Labor, 
we use information at a more aggregate level (CRIS classification).  
Then, in our wage floor data set, we calculate the average ratio of wage floors on NMW 
within each job category. We multiply this ratio by 1.4 to take into account for the fact that 
actual wages are on average 40% higher than wage floors. Using the number of employees 
by actual wage category in each industry, we can  then impute the number of employees for 
each job category. We compute this number of employees by category of the job 
classification so that the sum of employees over job classification categories is equal to the 
total number of employees in the industry. We use this statistic to calculate the weighted 
statistics such as the average wage floor, distribution of wage floor changes, … 
                                                     
27http://dares.travail-emploi.gouv.fr/dares-etudes-et-statistiques/tableaux-de-bord/les-portraits-statistiques-de-
branches-professionnelles/les-250-portraits-statistiques-structurels/article/conventions-collectives-de-branche-
fiches-statistiques 
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- Industries with a high versus a low proportion of minimum-wage workers  
In some cases, we run separate regressions for industries with a high versus a low proportion 
of minimum-wage workers. To define industries with either a high or a low proportion of 
NMW workers, we use the summary statistics published by the Ministry of Labor on the 
proportion of workers along the wage distribution (see above) and calculate the proportion of 
workers whose actual wage is below 1.2*NMW. If the proportion of workers paid less than 
1.2*NMW in a given industry is below (resp. above) the median of the c.d.f. of this 
proportion across industries, we define this industry as an industry with a low (respectively, a 
high) proportion of minimum-wage workers. 
- Wage indices  
Information on actual wages is not available at the “contractual” industry level. To construct industry 
level series of actual wages for each contractual industry ,, we use hourly wage indices at the 
sector-specific level (there are 90 sectors in the NACE statistical classification; source: French 
Ministry of Labor) and the employment sectoral structure of “contractual” industries (i.e., the number 
of workers in each NACE sector for a given “contractual” industry).  Industry-level actual wage 
indices are computed as the averages of NACE sectoral wage indices weighted by the number of 
workers in a NACE sector for each “contractual” industry. By construction, these NACE industry-
level wage indices are corrected for composition effects. They reflect the average wage increase in a 
given industry.  
- Industry-level unemployment  
To obtain industry-specific measures of unemployment, we use unemployment rates at the local labor 
market level (i.e. “zone d’emploi” in French; these “employment zones” are defined by Insee so that 
firms are able to find most of their labor force within these zones) and the geographical employment 
structure of “contractual” industries (using the administrative “DADS fichier détail”). We then 
compute an industry-specific measure of unemployment as the weighted average of local 
unemployment rates.  
- Industry-level output gap 
We calculate the industry-level output gap by using sectoral turnover indices (i.e. “indices de chiffres 
d’affaires” in French; we consider the 90 sectors of the the NACE statistical classification, source: 
Insee). Using employment structures of “contractual” industries, we compute average weighted 
turnover indices for each “contractual” industry. We then calculate the industry-specific output gap as 
the difference between the industry-specific turnover index and its linear trend.  
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Figure A: Timing of wage floor adjustments 
 
 Notes: t0 and t1 correspond to dates of wage agreements. “NMW” is the national minimum wage that can be 
changed at all dates. “Wage” corresponds to actual individual wages that can be adjusted by different factors, 
including NMW and wage floors. “Wage Floor” corresponds to wage floors that are adjusted at each wage 
agreement. They can impact actual wages and are impacted by past changes in actual wages in a given industry, 
but also by changes in the NMW level. 
-
t0 t0+τ -1…
NMWt0+τ -1 - NMWt0 NMWt1 – NMWt1-1
Wage Floort1 – Wage Floort0
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Waget0+τ -1 - Waget0
+
2
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Figure B: Average wage floors versus average actual wages (2011) 
 
Notes: Actual average gross wages are collected and published by the Ministry of Labor for the year 2011 (in 
euro). Using our data, we calculate the weighted average wage floor for each industry in year 2011. Each point 
represents a given industry whereas the dark line is the line y = x. 
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Figure C: Distribution of durations (in years) between two successive signing dates of 
wage agreements (or two dates of wage agreement enforcement) 
 
Notes: durations are computed as the difference between two successive signing dates of wage agreements (or 
two dates of agreement enforcement). All industries are considered over the period 2007-2015. 
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Figure D: Estimates of time effects in Probit regression using date controls: dates of 
wage agreement signing 
 
Notes: These figures report parameter estimates (black solid line) and 95%-confidence interval (black dashed 
lines) associated with date dummies used as time controls in the Probit regressions (equation 2). Q42015 is 
chosen as the reference quarter.   
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Figure E: Proportion of industry-level wage agreements (in percent) by quarter 
 
Notes: The light grey line is the weighted proportion of agreements that are signed in a given quarter and the 
black line is the same proportion but for agreement enforcement. We compute those statistics for three periods: 
2007-2015, 2007-2010 where the NMW was usually adjusted in Q3 and 2010-2015 where the NMW was usually 
adjusted in Q1.  
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Figure F: Proportion of industries with at least a wage floor below the NMW over time 
 
Notes: the grey histogram (right axis) corresponds to NMW increases (in percentage). The dark solid line is the 
proportion of industries with at least one wage floor below the NMW (in percentage) calculated as the ratio of 
the total number of employees in non-conform industries over the total number of employees. The grey dashed 
line represents the proportion of industries (weighted by the number of employees) in which wage agreements 
come into effect at a given date (quarter-year). 
  
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
NMW increases (Right axis)
Proportion of industries which have at least one wage floor below the NMW (Dummy non conformity) (Left axis)
Frequency of agreements (Left axis)
44 
 
Figure G: Elasticity of wage floor variations with respect to the real NMW increases and 
to inflation along the wage floor distribution (industry heterogeneity) 
a) Real NMW 
 
b) Inflation  
 
Notes: This figure reports parameter estimates obtained by adding to our baseline Tobit model interaction terms 
capturing the relative position of a wage floor along the wage distribution (with respect to the NMW level). The 
black lines report elasticities of the nominal wage floors with respect to NMW increases (in real terms). The grey 
lines report elasticities of nominal wage floors with respect to inflation. Estimates associated with the curve 
“High prop. of NMW workers” are based on the subsample of industries with a national coverage and with a 
proportion of minimum-wage workers higher than the median among all industries. Estimates associated with 
the curve “Low prop. of NMW workers” are based on the subsample of industries with a national coverage and 
with a proportion of minimum-wage workers smaller than the median among all industries. Estimates associated 
with the curve “Metalworking” are based on the subsample containing local metalworking industries 
“Construction and public works” are based on the subsample containing regional construction industries. For 
those two last groups, managers are not included since they are covered by a national industry, thus there is no 
wage floors above 2.09 NMW. 
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Figure H: Elasticity of wage floor variations with respect to the real NMW increases and 
to inflation along the wage floor distribution (industries with at least 8 wage categories 
versus all industries) 
a) Real NMW 
 
b) Inflation  
 
Notes: This figure reports parameter estimates obtained by adding to our baseline Tobit model interaction terms 
(dummy variables) which capture the relative position of a wage floor along the wage distribution. This relative 
position is calculated with reference to the NMW level. The black line reports elasticities of the nominal wage 
floors with respect to NMW increases (in real terms). The grey lines report elasticities of nominal wage floors 
with respect to inflation.   
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Table A: Marginal effects of covariates in the Probit model for wage agreement signing 
Dependent variable - Dummy variable for a 
wage agreement signing (1) (2) 
Cumulated inflation 7.020*** (0.536) 
7.653*** 
(0.517) 
Cumulated real NMW 2.755*** (0.573) 
2.950*** 
(0.568) 
Cumulated real aggregate wage change 7.687*** (0.949) 
8.416*** 
(0.920) 
Cumulated real wage change in the industry 1.992 (1.362) 
2.226* 
(1.326) 
Local unemployment rate -0.002 (0.017) 
0.002 
(0.019) 
Output gap -0.547** (0.245) 
-0.484* 
(0.245) 
Duration 
  
              6 months -0.019* (0.011) 
-0.026** 
(0.011) 
              1 year 0.312*** (0.012) 
0.313*** 
(0.012) 
2 years 0.168*** (0.022) 
0.175*** 
(0.022) 
Before 2010  
  Non-compliance with the NMW  0.003 (0.006) 
After 2010   
 Non-compliance with the NMW  0.045*** (0.006) 
N 12,136 12,136 
Dates dummies Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes 
Note: This table reports marginal effects estimated with Probit models. Standard errors are obtained using 
bootstrap methods and are reported in brackets. The dependent variable is the dummy variable equal to 1 if there 
is a wage agreement in industry j at date t (quarter-year). Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 
0.1. 
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Table B: Parameter estimates of the Tobit model – Wage floor changes – Large vs small 
firms 
 
Dependent variable : 
Nominal wage floor changes 
High share of 
large firms 
Low share of 
large firms 
High share of 
small firms 
Low share of 
small firms 
Cumulated inflation 0.618*** (0.040) 
0.570*** 
(0.043) 
0.527*** 
(0.039) 
0.653*** 
(0.051) 
Cumulated real NMW 
change 
0.261*** 
(0.035) 
0.237*** 
(0.031) 
0.227*** 
(0.039) 
0.247*** 
(0.030) 
Cumulated real aggregate 
wage change 
0.161** 
(0.072) 
0.167*** 
(0.057) 
0.242*** 
(0.060) 
0.099* 
(0.058) 
Cumulated real wage change 
in the industry 
0.059 
(0.148) 
0.295*** 
(0.089) 
0.243* 
(0.127) 
0.171 
(0.138) 
Local unemployment rate 0.000 (0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Output gap 0.028 (0.021) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
0.030* 
(0.017) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
Mills Ratio 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.000) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.001** 
(0.000) 
R2 0.653 0.533 0.533 0.642 
N 7,959 11,752 9,608 10,103 
Time dummies Date Date Date Date 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is the nominal (or real) wage floor change between two effects of wage 
agreements in a given industry. Estimates in the column “High share of large firms” (resp., low share) are for 
industries in which the share of firms with more than 500 employees is above (resp. below) the median (0.25%). 
Estimates in the column “High share of small firms” (resp., low share) are for industries in which the share of 
firms with less than 10 employees is above (resp., below) the median (69%). Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, 
** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1 
 
  
48 
 
Table C: Variance decomposition of annual wage floor growth within industries and 
across industries 
 
R2 of cross sectional regressions of year-on-year wage floor 
growth on industry fixed effects 
2007 0.70 
2008 0.70 
2009 0.69 
2010 0.72 
2011 0.84 
2012 0.70 
2013 0.76 
2014 0.74 
2015 0.72 
 
Note: Reported R-squared are obtained by regressing, for each year of our sample, year-on-year wage floor 
growth on industry fixed effects. It measures variance of annual wage growth explained by industry-specific 
difference. The remaining variance is explained by differences in annual wage growth across occupations within 
the same industry. 
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Table D: Parameter estimates of the Tobit model – Wage floor changes – Before / after 
2010 
Dependent variable: Nominal wage floor changes 
  
All 
High prop. 
of min. 
wage 
workers 
Low prop. of 
min. wage 
workers 
Metalworking 
Construction 
and public 
works 
Before 2010      
Cumulated inflation 0.600*** 
(0.056) 
0.601*** 
(0.068) 
0.405*** 
(0.091) 
0.725*** 
(0.082) 
0.570*** 
(0.153) 
Cumulated real 
NMW change 0.235*** (0.048) 
0.359*** 
(0.076) 
0.244*** 
(0.060) 
0.160*** 
(0.062) 
0.272*** 
(0.071) 
Cum. real aggregate 
wage change 
0.187** 
(0.087) 
0.157* 
(0.091) 
0.279* 
(0.164) 
0.274 
(0.186) 
0.132 
(0.107) 
Cum. real wage 
change in the industry 
0.462*** 
(0.145) 
-0.115 
(0.177) 
0.640*** 
(0.191) 
1.692*** 
(0.607) 
1.454*** 
(0.496) 
After 2010 
     
Cumulated inflation 0.575*** 
(0.053) 
0.556*** 
(0.062) 
0.514*** 
(0.089) 
0.728*** 
(0.083) 
0.631*** 
(0.069) 
Cumulated real 
NMW change 
0.258*** 
(0.044) 
0.232*** 
(0.060) 
0.294*** 
(0.077) 
0.219*** 
(0.062) 
0.361*** 
(0.065) 
Cum. real aggregate 
wage change 
0.182** 
(0.081) 
0.249*** 
(0.090) 
0.040 
(0.154) 
0.090 
(0.115) 
0.174* 
(0.105) 
Cum. real wage 
change in the industry 
0.034 
(0.105) 
-0.081 
(0.151) 
-0.004 
(0.158) 
0.100 
(0.315) 
1.120** 
(0.460) 
Unemployment rate 0.000 
(0.002) 
0.006** 
(0.003) 
0.005 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
Output gap 0.021 
(0.016) 
-0.008 
(0.022) 
-0.001 
(0.032) 
-0.013 
(0.048) 
-0.027 
(0.025) 
Mills Ratio -0.001*** 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
-0.002*** 
(0.001) 
R2 0.580 0.540 0.536 0.681 0.820 
N 19,711 6,516 5,009 5,262 2,924 
Time dummies Date Date Date Date Date 
Industry dummies Y Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The dependent variable is the nominal (or real) wage floor change between two effects of wage 
agreements in a given industry. Estimates in the column “High prop. of min. wage workers” are based on the 
subsample of industries with a national coverage and with a proportion of minimum-wage workers higher than 
the median among all industries. Estimates in the column “Low prop of min. wage workers” are based on the 
subsample of industries with a national coverage and with a proportion of minimum-wage workers smaller than 
the median among all industries. Estimates in the column “Metalworking” are based on the subsample 
containing local metalworking industries. Estimates in the column “Construction and Public works” are based on 
the subsample containing regional construction and public works industries. Significance levels: *** p < 0.01, ** 
p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.  
 
